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Should We Care, and What Are the Options?
An expanding economy no longer seems a panacea, allowing us to reduce 
poverty while we all become richer. 
 —Rebecca Blank, a member of the Clinton administration’s Council of 
 Economic Advisers, speaking about how poverty rose in the 1980s
The best antipoverty program is still a job. 
 —President Bill Clinton at a 1996 news conference on welfare legislation
The intergenerational poverty that troubles us so much today is predominantly 
a poverty of values. 
 —Vice President Dan Quayle in his famous 1992 “Murphy Brown” speech, 
 arguing that a lack of personal values is the primary cause of poverty
Concern about the well-being of the least fortunate Americans has 
ebbed	 and	flowed	over	 the	 last	 century.	The	New	Deal	 initiatives	 of	
the 1930s stimulated interest in helping those hit hardest by the Great 
Depression. During the war years and the prosperous 1950s, the pres-
ence of the poor faded from the consciousness of many Americans, but 
concern	for	their	plight	again	intensified	during	Lyndon	Johnson’s	War	
on Poverty in the 1960s. Since then, interest in reducing poverty has 
continued to experience ups and downs: poverty rates are no lower to-
day than when the War on Poverty ended in the late 1960s; on the con-
trary, high poverty exists in many regions of the country. To be sure, the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina once again reminded Americans that 
concentrations of high poverty remain within our borders.
 Much of the current popular discourse is driven by the view that 
public efforts to reduce poverty are not worthwhile, let alone effective 
(Moore 1997). One result of this skepticism was the landmark 1996 
reform of federal welfare policy, which greatly increased the personal 
responsibility of the disadvantaged for their own well-being. In fact, 
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reducing overall poverty was not even an explicit goal of the 1996 wel-
fare reform legislation (Ellwood and Blank 2001). Policies designed 
to eliminate regional pockets of poverty have been criticized on the 
grounds that it would be more effective to direct policies at individuals 
and not at places (Peters and Fisher 2002).
Even as interest in antipoverty efforts waned and skepticism grew, 
the U.S. poverty rate fell to 11.3 percent in 2000 (the lowest it had been 
since 1974), including a record low average rate of 13.4 percent in non-
metropolitan areas (ERS 2004). This could be interpreted as being the 
result of a favorable link between growth and poverty-rate reduction 
that had seemingly been nonexistent from the 1970s through the early 
1990s but that had reestablished itself since then (Blank and Card 1993; 
Freeman 2001). The Council of Economic Advisers (1999) and O’Neill 
and Hill (2001) argue that welfare reform was the impetus behind the 
reduced number of welfare caseloads, which may then have contributed 
to lower poverty. Yet others note the potential interaction between a 
strong	economy	and	the	success	of	welfare	reform	(e.g.,	Moffitt	1999).
Despite the nationwide antipoverty gains of the 1990s, poverty 
rates remained high in many metropolitan central cities and inner sub-
urbs (Jargowsky 2003) and in remote nonmetropolitan areas (Miller 
and Weber 2004). This raises the question of whether these areas ex-
perienced subpar economic performance compared to the nation or 
whether there was less of a connection between local economic growth 
and poverty in these areas. The answer to this question would relate to 
whether there is a need for place-based policies and would help inform 
their design.
In	 the	 remainder	 of	 this	 chapter,	we	 first	 provide	 a	 rationale	 for	
society to become more engaged in reducing poverty, including at the 
regional	level.	We	then	briefly	review	the	evidence	on	the	connection	
between employment growth, welfare reform, and poverty at the na-
tional level. The implications of the national trends for regional poverty 
follow; we particularly consider the relative merits of place-based and 
person-based policies for evening out spatial concentrations of poverty. 
This includes a discussion of the role space plays in poverty outcomes, 
because national growth policies alone may do little to ameliorate per-
sistent regional pockets of poverty. We introduce the possibility that 
local economic growth, using place-based employment supports, may 
be a needed tool for reducing poverty. The chapter concludes with an 
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overview of the remainder of the book, whose primary emphasis is the 
spatial dimension of the relationship between economic performance 
and poverty, including an examination of competing explanations such 
as federal and state welfare reform. 
WHy SOCIETy SHOuLD CARE ABOuT POvERTy
There are both philosophical and practical reasons why the Ameri-
can public should be concerned with the well-being of its poorest mem-
bers. For one, according to the Rawlsian view, if individuals in a group 
selected a distribution of income for the members of the group before 
they knew how each of them would fare—i.e., if they had a “veil of 
ignorance” concerning the outcome—risk-averse individuals would 
pick the distribution that maximized the well-being of the least-well-off 
member of the group (Rawls 1971). In our wealthy society, application 
of Rawlsian logic would eliminate poverty. Nevertheless, while the no-
tion that individuals are risk-averse and interested in justice before the 
fact is thought-provoking, public policy does not work in the realm of 
the “veil of ignorance.” Rather, it is affected by politicians reliant on 
voters who are fully aware of their actual or most probable place in the 
income distribution. 
Beyond the abstractions of philosophical arguments, Americans are 
well grounded in notions of justice, equity, and a sense of fair play. 
Madden (2000) presents evidence showing that a strong majority of the 
U.S. public prefers a more equal distribution of income. However, the 
catch is that the public tends to be very skeptical of whether government 
intervention is the proper vehicle to satisfy its desire for equity. Indeed, 
the	issue	reflects	a	fundamental	tenet	of	neoclassical	economics,	which	
is	that	there	is	an	equity-efficiency	tradeoff	(Okun	1975):	societies	can	
achieve more equity and less poverty through redistribution of income, 
but by blunting economic incentives, attaining this goal comes at the 
expense	of	economic	efficiency	and	growth.	Yet	other	economists	argue	
against the existence of an inverse relationship between equity and ef-
ficiency,	instead	contending	that	greater	inequality	reduces	growth	by	
producing	societal	upheaval,	inefficient	government	redistribution,	and	
suboptimal investment in human and physical capital.1
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Besides notions of equity and fairness, there are practical reasons 
for society to be concerned about the well-being of its lowest-income 
members. For example, lower poverty may encourage disadvantaged 
segments of the population to become more civilly engaged in their 
communities because they feel they are legitimate stakeholders. High-
er poverty, on the other hand, adversely affects the physical health of 
the workforce, which, besides reducing poor people’s quality of life, 
reduces their workplace productivity and ultimately increases public 
health care expenditures and their reliance on other government pro-
grams (Scott 2005). If poverty is reduced through improved labor mar-
ket participation, then benefactors will enjoy long-term gains through 
enhanced labor market experience, increased skills upgrading, and, in 
turn, higher future earnings (Bartik 2001). 
Perhaps the largest societal gains from poverty reduction occur 
through intergenerational linkages. The environment created by fami-
lies	facing	severe	financial	stress	is	not	optimal	for	raising	children,	par-
ticularly for developing their cognitive and noncognitive skills. There 
are	significant	ramifications	in	adulthood	when	children	from	difficult	
circumstances fall behind early. There is growing consensus in the lit-
erature that the income of a child’s family has long-term impacts on that 
child’s health, education, nutrition, and future income and welfare as 
an adult (Carneiro and Heckman 2003; Case, Fertig, and Paxson 2003; 
Karoly et al. 1998). These intergenerational effects suggest the potential 
benefits	from	poverty	reduction	can	be	large	simply	in	terms	of	future	
earnings and health care savings from the children of disadvantaged fam-
ilies. In contrast, Carneiro and Heckman (2003) note that later interven-
tions, such as tuition policies for underprivileged college students, likely 
have smaller marginal effects on improving future earnings.
Another	indirect	benefit	of	poverty	reduction	relates	to	the	link	be-
tween labor market conditions and crime (Freeman 2001; Freeman and 
Rodgers 1999; Raphael and Winter-Ember 2001). These studies suggest 
that 33–40 percent of the large decrease in crime during the 1990s can 
be attributed to the strong economy of those years.2 This effect implies 
large	antipoverty	benefits	in	terms	of	savings	from	reduced	victimiza-
tion, lower expenditures on protective measures, and lower incarcera-
tion costs associated with reduced recidivism.
In	 summary,	 reducing	poverty	can	provide	 substantial	benefits	 in	
many ways: improved social engagement, higher economic potential, 
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greater long-term earnings for positively affected individuals, lower 
crime,	and	significant	long-term	gains	for	affected	children	in	terms	of	
health, education, and income in adulthood. Associated gains include 
eventual reductions in government expenditures for public assistance, 
health care, and the criminal justice system. Along with even modest 
concerns for equity and fairness, these advantages provide continued 
justification	for	aggressively	fighting	poverty.	And	the	potential	gains	
are likely greatest where poverty is geographically most concentrated.
NATIONAL POvERTy AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
Numerous measures of poverty exist, each with relative advantages 
and	disadvantages.	We	use	 the	 official	 federal	 poverty	 rate	 (see	Box	
1.1), which is not perfect but is well known and has been consistently 
measured	over	 time.	Also	 to	 its	advantage,	 the	official	 federal	 rate	 is	
used both in assessing and in setting government policy. As an example 
of	 the	 federal	 definition	 of	 poverty,	 a	 household	with	 one	 adult	 (un-
der 65 years of age) and two children had to have earned more than 
$14,824 to be above the poverty line in 2003, while a household con-
taining two adults (under 65) and two children had to have earned more 
than $18,660. 
As shown in Figures 1.1 and 1.2, there were remarkable reductions 
in poverty during the 1960s and early 1970s. This was true regardless of 
whether one considered person or family poverty rates (Figure 1.1), or 
even female-headed-family poverty rates (Figure 1.2). With that prog-
ress, an observer in the early 1970s had reason to be optimistic that 
the War on Poverty would ultimately be won. Nevertheless, subsequent 
trends show that poverty has remained a persistent element of American 
society.
Even though the 1980s and 1990s had two of the three longest eco-
nomic expansions on record, the person and family poverty rates in 
2002 were little changed from what they were when the War on Poverty 
ended more than 30 years ago (Figure 1.1). In fact, U.S. Census Bureau 
(2004a) data suggest that while real median-family income rose by 7 
percent between 1973 and 1993, the person poverty rate increased from 
11.1 percent to 15.1 percent (the second highest rate since 1965). Figure 
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 Box 1.1  Official Federal Poverty Thresholds
Social Security Administration economist Mollie Orshansky 
originally	developed	the	official	federal	poverty	criteria	in	1963–
1964 (U.S. Census Bureau 2004h; Fisher 1997). Orshansky cal-
culated the economy food budgetary requirements of 58 family 
types based on age and family size (currently 48 family types are 
used).	For	each	family	type,	she	simply	multiplied	this	figure	by	
three to obtain what is now called the poverty threshold. For the 
most	part,	Orshansky’s	definition	has	remained	unchanged	except	
that	it	is	adjusted	upward	for	inflation	every	year.
In determining poverty status, before-tax income is used, in-
cluding	public	assistance	but	not	capital	gains.	The	official	poverty	
rate is not adjusted for several factors such as the Earned Income 
Tax Credit or in-kind public welfare programs like Medicaid. Nor 
is it adjusted for regional cost-of-living differences. To give a feel 
for the resulting thresholds, we present the following examples: a 
three-person household with one adult (under 65 years of age) and 
two children needed to earn more than $15,219 to be above the 
poverty line in 2004, while a two-adult (under 65) and two-child 
household needed to earn more than $19,157. Comparable three- 
and four-person households needed to earn $13,423 and $16,895 
in	1999	and	$9,990	and	$12,575	 in	1989—the	 increase	 reflects	
inflation	(U.S.	Census	Bureau	2005e).
The	official	definition	can	be	criticized	for	not	adjusting	for	
taxes and in-kind contributions. It also does not account for the 
notion that poverty is often viewed as a relative concept: what is 
considered economic deprivation changes over time with rising 
living standards.a For example, an upper-middle-class standard of 
living a century ago would now be one devoid of modern conve-
niences. Nonetheless, developing alternative measures of poverty 
rates is full of pitfalls in that they can be ad hoc and they may not 
capture true conceptions of poverty. For more details on alterna-
tive poverty measures, see U.S. Census Bureau (2003). 
Despite	 these	 concerns,	 the	 official	 poverty	 rate	measure	 is	
used because it is well known, has been consistent over time, and 
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1.2 shows that the poverty rate increased for female-headed families 
during this 20-year period from 32.2 to 35.6 percent, or slightly less 
than the increases in overall rates in Figure 1.1. This reversal in trend 
led many experts to question whether economic growth was continu-
ing to trickle down to the poor (Blank and Card 1993; Cutler and Katz 
1991). 
With the link between growth and poverty seemingly broken and 
poverty rates stagnant or rising, questions arose as to whether govern-
mental efforts to eliminate poverty had instead made matters worse. 
Indeed, Stephen Moore (1997) contended that the “War on Poverty, 
launched by Lyndon Johnson thirty years ago, has probably been the 
most destructive government concept ever invented.” However, the ar-
gument that growth was no longer “lifting all boats” also did not go un-
challenged. For instance, Bartik (2001) argues that it is counterintuitive 
to expect economic growth not to reduce the poverty rate unless there is 
an accompanying increase in income inequality.
Even as the debate raged about the role of economic growth in re-
ducing poverty, the poverty rate began a precipitous decline near the 
Box 1.1  (continued)
 
is used in both assessing and setting government policy. Even more 
important is that it is widely reported for various demographic 
groups and geographical areas. To be sure, the Census Bureau has 
recently reported a variety of alternative poverty rate thresholds. 
Yet these are not as widely reported across geographical areas, 
and their data usually only cover a short time span, dating back to 
the latter 1990s. Moreover, at least in terms of the change in pov-
erty rates, the alternative poverty rate measures tend to follow the 
official	one	quite	closely	(see,	for	example,	U.S.	Census	Bureau	
2003). That is, while the actual poverty rate percentage may de-
pend on the particular alternative used, the more critical measure, 
change in poverty rate, is approximately the same over time.
a See	Slesnick	(1993)	for	a	detailed	discussion	of	problems	with	official	poverty	
thresholds.
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end of the 1990s economic expansion, as shown in Figure 1.1. It fell 
from 15.1 percent in 1993 to 11.3 percent in 2000 (the lowest mark 
since 1974). Subsequently, however, sluggish economic conditions and 
rising unemployment yielded a modest increase in poverty from 2001 
to 2003. One possible explanation for the seemingly closer link with 
economic	conditions	is	that	growth	has	its	strongest	influence	on	lifting	
households out of poverty when the unemployment rate falls to levels 
so low that businesses are forced to hire the chronically unemployed 
and less skilled (Freeman 2001). This reasoning may explain the suc-
cesses of the 1960s and latter 1990s, as the unemployment rate fell 
below 4 percent in both cases. The disappointing persistence of the pov-
erty level during the expansions of the latter 1970s and 1980s may have 
resulted	from	relatively	loose	labor	markets.	Although	firms	may	have	
been	hiring	workers	during	 those	 times,	 there	was	a	 sufficient	queue	
of applicants that employers never had to reach down to hire the more 
disadvantaged.	Such	a	nonlinear	response	suggests	that	the	influence	of	
policies on poverty will vary depending on labor market conditions.
Figure 1.3 shows the changes in the U.S. individual and family 
poverty rates from 1960 to 2003, along with the annual changes in the 
unemployment rate. While the correlation is not perfect, there appears 
to be a clear, positive relationship between the change in the unemploy-
Figure 1.1  u.S. Family and Person Poverty Rates, 1959–2003 (%)
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2004a).
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Figure 1.3  Change in u.S. Poverty and unemployment Rates, 
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Figure 1.2  Female-Headed Family Poverty Rate, 1959–2003 (%)
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2004b).
SOURCE: Person rate, U.S. Census Bureau (2004a); family rate, U.S. Census Bureau 
(2004b); unemployment rate, BLS (2006c).
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ment rate and changes in poverty rates. The simple correlation between 
the change in unemployment and the change in family poverty is 0.66, 
while the corresponding correlation between the change in unemploy-
ment and the change in person poverty is 0.65. 
Welfare Reform and Policy Changes in the 1990s
The	1990s	was	a	period	of	significant	public	policy	change,	as	 it	
related	to	the	working	and	nonworking	poor.	The	first	change	was	the	
expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), which greatly in-
creased work incentives. Then came the Clinton administration’s accel-
erated issuance of state waivers from the Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) program, beginning in 1993 (Council of Economic 
Advisers 1999; Ellwood and Blank 2001). Most waivers made welfare 
more restrictive, such as by adding sanctions for non-compliance with 
work	requirements	and	by	adding	time	limits	for	receiving	benefits.
A third initiative was the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which replaced AFDC 
with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. 
Known as “welfare reform,” the 1996 act eliminated the welfare en-
titlement and placed a strict 60-month federal lifetime limit on most 
recipients; it also put stringent requirements on states to shift most re-
cipients into work by 2002 (Blank 2002; Ellwood and Blank 2001). 
New legal immigrants faced restrictions in using TANF, and there were 
other changes to help reduce births to unwed mothers. Financing was 
changed to a federal block grant, and states were given great latitude to 
set	program	parameters,	including	those	for	benefits	and	eligibility.
Between August 1996, when welfare reform was signed, and Sep-
tember 2001, the number of recipients declined by a remarkable 56 per-
cent (Administration for Children and Families [ACF] 2002a). Even 
with the sluggish economy, the number of welfare recipients fell slight-
ly in Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003 (ACF 2002b, 2004). Congress has 
periodically worked on renewing welfare reform, but progress has been 
slow. Most indications are that the act will remain largely unchanged; 
however, some likely changes include increased child care support, 
greater	flexibility	for	states	in	counting	“work-related”	activities,	and	a	
modest increase in work requirements (U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services [DHHS] 2004).
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Many economists argue that welfare reform and the work-promo-
tion effects of the expanded EITC were key factors behind the almost 
10-percentage-point increase between 1994 and 2000 in the labor force 
participation of unmarried females with children (Blank and Schmidt 
2001). The Council of Economic Advisers (1999) and O’Neill and Hill 
(2001) hold that welfare reform was the impetus for reducing the num-
ber of welfare recipients. Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) conclude that 
60 percent of the increase in employment of single mothers relative 
to single women without children over the 1984–1996 period was at-
tributable to the federal and state EITC and other tax changes, whereas 
welfare	reforms	over	the	12-year	period	were	much	less	important―al-
though	they	did	have	significant	effects.	Yet	others	contend	that	welfare	
reform’s supposed initial success had little to do with policy and is more 
of an artifact of the robust economy of the late 1990s.3 A comprehensive 
literature review by Blank (2002) suggests that welfare reform and the 
strong economy both reduced welfare usage. 
Though welfare reform is important, we are ultimately interested 
in whether it affects poverty. The poverty rate for unmarried women 
with children—a key welfare-recipient cohort—fell from 41.9 percent 
in 1996 to 33.0 percent in 2000, before rising to 33.7 percent in 2002 
(U.S. Census Bureau 2004b). Yet this could be more economy-driven 
than welfare-reform driven. Also, even if welfare reform did greatly 
reduce	the	rolls,	it	is	still	possible	that	it	had	little	influence	on	chang-
ing the average household income at the lower end of the distribution; 
it	may	have	merely	reallocated	income	from	welfare	benefits	to	labor	
earnings and the EITC (Blank 2002; Primus 2001).
Welfare reform has also expanded the low-skilled labor supply by 
encouraging work. The increased labor supply should have a deleteri-
ous effect on the wages and employment of low-skilled nonrecipients, 
which would indirectly increase poverty rates (Bartik 2000, 2002a,b). 
The possible indirect spillovers suggest that the impact of welfare re-
form could extend well beyond the most directly affected groups, which 
means aggregate labor market assessments are necessary to explore 
how welfare reform affected the overall poverty rate.
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PERSON- vS. PLACE-BASED POLICy
Despite declining U.S. poverty in the 1990s, the gains were not 
spatially uniform, and many high-poverty pockets remain (Jargowsky 
2003). It is unclear why all geographic areas did not experience the same 
favorable developments as the nation as a whole. It could be that some 
areas experienced lower growth. Alternatively, spatial factors unique 
to certain areas may have affected the connection between growth and 
poverty. If so, person-based antipoverty policies alone may be inad-
equate; instead, what may be required are policies tailored to place.
There is wide debate within the academic and policy communities 
on whether policies aimed at helping the poor should include place-
specific	 elements	 to	 complement	 person-specific	 programs	 (Kraybill	
and Kilkenny 2003). However, critics contend that policies designed to 
help distressed communities or regions with concentrations of poverty 
are misguided and wasteful, and that the best way to aid the disadvan-
taged is to tailor policies to directly help needy individuals (e.g., Peters 
and Fisher 2002). Policies such as providing education, training, job 
and family counseling, relocation assistance, and certain types of health 
care assistance form the core of person-based approaches.
Critics of place-based subsidies contend that they can induce the 
disadvantaged not to migrate to localities with better employment op-
portunities, which creates a culture of dependency in the region (Glae-
ser 1998; Glaeser, Kolko, and Saiz 2001; Kraybill and Kilkenny 2003). 
They contend that virtually all of the newly created jobs will instead go 
to commuters and new residents who already have the necessary skills 
and experience that employers prefer, and not to the intended disadvan-
taged	beneficiaries	(Peters	and	Fisher	2002).	Therefore,	policies	aimed	
at improving a distressed local economy (e.g., tax breaks) may primar-
ily help business and property owners instead of the disadvantaged. 
Critics of place-based policy also point out that economic develop-
ment efforts may fail in high-poverty areas. For example, the small-
scale economies of remote rural areas may hinder their economic 
development:	not	only	may	 there	be	 insufficient	public	 infrastructure	
for such areas to be economically competitive (Lucas 2001; Jalan and 
Ravallion 2002; Glasmeier and Farrigan 2003), but there may be a back-
wash effect of jobs and capital being drawn toward urban centers and 
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away from these areas (Barkley, Henry, and Bao 1996; Henry, Barkley, 
and Bao 1997). Further, the exodus of highly mobile, highly skilled 
labor from high-poverty regions may lower the pay of those remaining 
(Gibbs 1994). 
On the other hand, there are traditional and emerging arguments for 
place-based policies to be part of the optimal policy mix, based on the 
“new economic geography.” As discussed in Chapter 3 of this book, 
equilibrating market responses are impeded if labor is not perfectly mo-
bile, particularly the low-skilled segment of labor, which is the most 
likely to be in poverty (Ravallion and Wodon 1999; Yankow 2003). 
Such arguments form the core of the urban spatial-mismatch models 
(Holzer 1991). Rural areas’ remoteness and greater distance to poten-
tial migration destinations increases the transport and psychic costs for 
those who may wish to relocate (Greenwood 1997). Therefore, while 
remoteness, small scale, or social and geographic isolation may be hin-
drances to successful economic development, they also may lead to dis-
advantaged	residents	garnering	more	of	the	benefits	if	economic	devel-
opment	is	successful,	suggesting	the	potential	efficacy	of	place-based	
antipoverty policies. That is, if job creation occurred in these distressed 
areas,	more	of	the	benefits	would	go	to	the	disadvantaged	because	the	
area’s remoteness would cut down on employment competition from 
new commuters or migrants.
Other arguments for place-based policies include the notion that 
geographical space produces monopolistic power, in which entry and 
exit costs reduce free-market adjustments (Kraybill and Kilkenny 2003). 
New-economic-geography arguments include agglomeration econo-
mies where productivity increases with greater urban scale or arises 
from	the	co-location	of	similar	firms	in	the	same	industry.	Agglomera-
tion economies can arise because of factors such as more specialized in-
put markets, specialized labor supply, and knowledge spillovers across 
firms.	Rural	areas	also	can	experience	agglomerations	when	 industry	
“clusters” co-locate to take advantage of enhanced vertical integration 
of inputs. Place-based policy advocates also argue that economic de-
velopment policies can effectively enhance local growth and reduce 
poverty because of factors such as neighborhood effects, economic role 
models, and knowledge spillovers.
In addition, advocates of place-based policies note that person-
based policies are expensive and that programs such as job training 
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may have relatively low returns, depending upon the location of the 
disadvantaged (Bartik 2001; Carneiro and Heckman 2003). Thus, sole 
reliance on people-based policies may be inadequate in addressing the 
spatial concentration of poverty (Blank 2005). Blank argues that place 
and	related	contextual	effects	influence	economic	vitality	and	shape	the	
character of the people.
The	wide	spatial	variation	in	local	attributes	can	thwart	“one	size	fits	
all” person-based policies. In isolated inner cities and remote rural areas, 
many of the disadvantaged have less access to job training, counseling, 
health care, child care, and transportation, suggesting that government 
service	delivery	should	reflect	these	spatial	differences	(Allard,	Tolman,	
and Rosen 2003). Work-support policies such as the provision of child 
care, transportation, education, and training also may have higher pay-
offs if jobs are nearby. Policies that improve a distressed community’s 
vitality and job accessibility may do more for its disadvantaged resi-
dents than approaches that give them lengthy training and hope they 
eventually	find	work	nearby	where	there	are	very	few	jobs,	or,	failing	
that, hope they move elsewhere (Kraybill and Kilkenny 2003).
Practically speaking, to ignore the spatial dimension of poverty is 
also to overlook the basic fact that most politicians and policymakers 
represent	specific	jurisdictions.	They	may	have	less	interest	in	the	nec-
essary person-based human capital development without the added at-
traction of well-planned (or even poorly planned) policies aimed at par-
ticular locations. Place-based policies also have the simple advantage 
that	governments	may	find	 it	 easier	 to	 target	appropriate	poor	places	
than	to	identify	the	appropriate	poor	households	with	specific	attributes	
(Ravallion and Wodon 1999). Likewise, because of the unpopularity of 
person-based programs such as welfare assistance with voters, it may 
be easier to obtain public support for policies aimed at distressed re-
gions than for policies directed at low-income individuals. 
OvERvIEW OF THIS BOOk
The following chapters explore the spatial dimension of U.S. pover-
ty, stressing differences across states, metropolitan areas, and counties, 
with	an	eye	toward	state	and	local	policy	prescriptions.	We	find	poverty	
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to be very unevenly distributed across the country, varying widely even 
within states and metropolitan areas. The great diversity in poverty out-
comes	leads	us	to	explore	finer	geographical	areas:	within	metropoli-
tan areas, we look at central-city counties and suburbs; beyond metro-
politan areas, we look at metro-adjacent and outlying, nonmetropolitan 
counties. The spatial detail of our study allows us to draw more focused 
policy conclusions. We conclude that the policy prescriptions should 
vary greatly across space.4
In assessing poverty, we explore the underlying spatial, demograph-
ic, and economic contributors to poverty rates. Although we do not 
need elaborate statistical analysis to know that single-mother-headed 
households tend to have high poverty rates and that areas with high 
unemployment also have elevated poverty, we still need to know the 
relative importance of each factor. If personal characteristics such as 
race and the prevalence of married-couple households are the overrid-
ing factor, policy should be focused more on supports to encourage 
stronger families and to mitigate racial discrimination. Alternatively, if 
the uneven geographical location of employment opportunities and an 
unfavorable industry composition are the important causal factors, then 
place-based policies aimed at improving employment opportunities in 
distressed areas would be more effective. Without a detailed statistical 
assessment, we will not be able to ascertain the proper policy mix and 
make informed policy prescriptions for different geographic areas. For 
example, policies that are effective in prosperous suburbs will likely 
differ from those that prove effective in more remote, rural areas.
Our assessment of the geographical diversity of American poverty 
begins in Chapter 2, where we examine the spatial variation of state and 
county poverty rates and their trends over time. Fully understanding the 
spatial distribution of poverty requires examining multiple geographi-
cal aggregations of poverty rates. Analysis of national poverty rates is 
necessary if one wants to determine the overall effectiveness of national 
full employment. Yet to understand the relative importance of econom-
ic growth versus welfare policies, states should be examined, because 
they	form	the	political	entity	 that	greatly	sets	and	defines	differential	
welfare policies. Understanding the underlying causes and policy solu-
tions that differ within metropolitan areas, or between urban centers and 
rural communities, requires analysis of disaggregated regions such as 
counties.
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Chapter 2 notes that state poverty rates vary greatly. The South 
tends to have the highest poverty rates. When examining the state pat-
terns	 over	 the	 period	 of	 1969–1999,	we	 find	 that	 there	 is	 some	 per-
sistence. Yet Southern states generally experienced marked reductions 
in poverty, while others, such as many Western states, had relatively 
lackluster performances.
When	examining	counties,	we	find	even	more	diversity.	First,	there	
are homogeneous low-poverty-rate clusters, such as in the upper Mid-
west, and high-poverty-rate clusters, such as in Appalachia or the Mis-
sissippi Delta. Yet poverty can vary greatly within a given state. For 
example, even in Southeastern states with high average poverty, there 
are low-poverty pockets within each state. Poverty can also take on a 
more haphazard pattern, such as the wide range found within larger 
metropolitan areas. Nevertheless, local poverty rates remain strikingly 
persistent. For example, areas that had higher poverty rates in the 1950s 
tend to have higher poverty rates today.
Chapter 3 discusses the elements of local low-wage labor markets 
that	 provide	 the	 theoretical	 justification	 for	 antipoverty	 policies.	 Lo-
cal labor markets respond differently to policies than does the national 
labor market. Improving the employment opportunities of the disad-
vantaged would seem to be a reasonable solution to persistently high 
poverty rates in certain locales. Yet a major complication is that newly 
created jobs often go to new migrants or commuters from elsewhere. 
The	 intended	beneficiaries—the	original,	poor	 residents—can	end	up	
with few of the new jobs. Hence, the notion that “a rising tide lifts all 
boats,” which seems reasonable in macroeconomic discussions, may 
not apply at the local level, though this differs by local area.
Chapter 4 provides a statistical assessment of the determinants of 
state poverty rates. In it, we emphasize roles of economic growth and 
state public welfare policies. In particular, we try to further determine 
whether the 1996 welfare reform had a major role in the dramatic pov-
erty rate outcomes in the 1990s. If so, this would give us grounds to be 
optimistic that Bush administration efforts to further emphasize work-
first	initiatives	will	be	successful.	We	find	that	state	economic	growth	
is an important cause of change in state poverty rates, and that this ef-
fect	is	especially	large	when	the	labor	market	is	tight.	This	influence	is	
both direct, through enhanced labor market opportunities, and indirect, 
through affecting other outcomes such as teen birthrates. In contrast, we 
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find	that	policies	related	to	welfare	reform	have	virtually	no	statistically	
significant	effect	on	state	poverty	rates.	Any	favorable	effects	on	the	la-
bor force behavior of potential welfare recipients appear to be offset by 
adverse spillovers on other disadvantaged workers through increased 
labor market competition. In Chapter 5, we look at case studies of four 
states,	which	confirm	the	results	of	the	statistical	analysis	and	provide	
context on the nexus between poverty, labor market performance, and 
welfare reform.
Chapter 6 examines 1989 and 1999 poverty rates for more than 
3,000	U.S.	counties.	One	finding	is	of	the	importance	of	family	char-
acteristics such as marital status and education. Female labor market 
participation and male unemployment rates are key labor market fac-
tors.	Yet	we	find	that,	generally,	employment	growth	has	only	a	modest	
impact on local poverty rates. Without some sort of targeting of the 
neediest, this suggests that local policies that increase employment will 
likely have only modest impacts on poverty; it further implies that a 
strong state and national economy are important reinforcing forces. An-
other pattern we see is that areas that had higher shares of foreign im-
migrants arriving in the latter 1990s also had higher 1999 poverty rates. 
This was a distinct change from the 1980s, when immigrant shares had 
no	detectable	influence.
One weakness of the empirical models in Chapter 6 is that they do 
not fully capture the geographical diversity of low-wage labor markets. 
Chapters 7 and 8 address this concern by separately considering metro-
politan and nonmetropolitan counties. One conclusion of Chapter 7 is 
that metropolitan areas are not a monolithic block that should be exam-
ined in unison. Rather, they are often composed of a mosaic of distinct 
central-city and suburban counties. Labor market conditions appear to 
have	an	even	weaker	influence	on	metropolitan	poverty	rates	than	on	
the nation as a whole. But this overlooks the greater responsiveness of 
poverty rates in central-city counties to changes in labor market condi-
tions.	Conversely,	new	suburban	jobs	are	so	regularly	filled	by	in-com-
muters	 that	poverty	 rates	 are	hardly	 influenced	by	 job	growth.	Thus,	
we argue that economic development policies can help disadvantaged 
central-city residents, as job accessibility appears to be a constraint, but 
that such policies will likely be ineffective in the suburbs. We describe 
job-creation strategies for central-city counties and indicate how they 
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can	be	targeted	to	ensure	that	the	intended	disadvantaged	beneficiaries	
capture	more	of	the	benefits.
Chapter 8 explores the dimensions of nonmetropolitan and rural 
poverty. Examination of rural poverty has been a relatively neglected 
field.	A	key	determinant	of	rural	poverty	is	whether	a	nonmetropolitan	
county is adjacent to a metropolitan area. Residents of nonmetropoli-
tan	counties	that	border	on	metropolitan	areas	have	significantly	better	
access to jobs, child care, and government services. Because remote 
nonmetropolitan counties are more isolated, it is not surprising that lo-
cal labor market conditions are much more important there. Moreover, 
if local employment growth is concentrated in industries that are faring 
well	at	the	national	level,	there	will	be	even	more	significant	declines	
in rural poverty rates. Hence, all other things being equal, we argue that 
economic	development	policies	likely	have	their	largest	benefits	in	rural	
areas, though these policies may be more expensive to implement in re-
mote areas. In contrast, we contend that the countless billions that have 
been	 spent	on	 specific	 resource-based	 industries,	 such	as	 agriculture,	
have had less-than-spectacular results on overall rural economic growth 
and should be redirected to higher-valued uses for rural America.
Chapter	9	summarizes	our	empirical	findings	and	policy	prescrip-
tions.	 Our	 foremost	 finding	 is	 that,	 while	 labor	 market	 conditions	
have modest impacts on poverty in general, they can have important 
impacts in central-city counties and in remote rural counties. Hence, 
place-based policies aimed at improving the employment prospects of 
disadvantaged workers in those places are in order. We describe how 
providing tax credits for newly created jobs and wage subsidies for low-
wage	workers	are	two	ways	of	targeting	the	intended	beneficiaries.	We	
also	stress	the	importance	of	first-source	or	community-based	organi-
zations in brokering and facilitating job creation. Other policies, such 
as offering relocation assistance to disadvantaged families, are most 
likely to work in central cities, but even there, the impact will likely be 
modest. On the other hand, we argue that child care assistance is more 
likely to be needed in remote rural areas. As with the role of economic 
development	policies,	we	conclude	that	a	one-size-fits-all	geographical	
approach to person-based policy is misguided. Each area may instead 
require a unique combination of place-based and person-based antipov-
erty policies.
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Notes
The	 first	 epigraph	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 chapter	 comes	 from	Gene	Koretz	 (1992),	
“Trickle-Down Economics May Not Help the Poor,” in Business Week. The second epi-
graph comes from the New York Times (1996) article “The Welfare Bill.” The third comes 
from a speech made to the Commonwealth Club of California by Quayle (1992). 
 1.  Whether inequality reduces economic growth is a hotly debated topic among 
economists. For example, Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini 
(1994)	find	evidence	that	it	reduces	growth,	while	Forbes	(2000)	and	Partridge	
(1997,	2005)	find	the	opposite.
 2. The 1990s saw the property crime rate drop by nearly 50 percent and the violent 
crime rate drop by nearly 40 percent (U.S. Department of Justice 2005).
 3.  For examples of discussion of the link between economic growth and welfare 
roles, see Bartik and Eberts (1999); Figlio and Ziliak (1999); Hoynes (2000b); 
and Bennett, Lu, and Song (2002).
 4. This book does not empirically examine subcounty poverty rates such as those 
found in poverty clusters that can exist at the neighborhood level (Weinberg, 
Reagan, and Yankow 2004). For example, rather than asking why a west-side 
Chicago neighborhood has higher poverty than a wealthy Highland Park neigh-
borhood in the northern suburbs, we instead ask geographically broader ques-
tions, such as “Why do Chicago suburbs have lower poverty rates than the 
metropolitan area’s central-city county?” This focus allows us to more directly 
consider economic development, which is inherently more widespread than a 
neighborhood.
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